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ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPARATIVE FAULT*
Dan B. Dobbs**
INTRODUCTION
There are constant developments in tort law, so many that it is
difficult to choose any one of them for an hour's discussion. Products
liability, for instance, continues to develop new ideas.' And likewise
the law of libel, a common-law Frankenstein monster adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the 1960's,2 and on which the
Court continues to perform new operations, to the dismay of nearly
everyone.3 Other courts as well have found themselves developing new
doctrines in defamation cases, for instance, by classifying many libels
as "opinion" in order to expand the free speech protection accorded
to such utterances. 4
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1. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986) (some
products unreasonably-dangerous per se).
2. The common law of libel was subject to substantial constitutional constraints in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964) (public officials
must prove knowing or reckless falsehood); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967) (same rule for public figures); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727, 88 S. Ct. 1323 (and defendant cannot be held liable without a high degree of
awareness that statement is probably false); and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, (1974) (private figure who need not prove knowing or reckless
falsehood but must prove some degree of fault plus actual damages). There are a number
of related cases.
3. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985),
the Court created a new category of speech that involved defamation of a private figure
(as in Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997) and lacked any public concern content. For
this category, the case permits recovery of presumed damages without proof of actual
loss, a recovery not permitted under Gertz. Whether the other Gertz requirement-fault-
is also dispensed with is not clear. There are a number of other recent cases which cannot
be mentioned here.
4. Notably Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2662 (1986); Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir, 1986), cert denied, 107
S. Ct. 272 (1986). Other defensive doctrines include the proposed protection for "neutral
reportage," Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S. Ct. 647 (1977), and the "libel-proof plaintiff doctrines,"
see Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2916 (1986).
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Other economic and dignitary torts have come in for their share
of innovation, too. Reverend Falwell's claim of mental distress re-
sulting from a nasty satire of him in a nasty magazine seems to have
opened a whole new field of liability of publishers. 5 Even the old tort
of malicious prosecution is being subjected to substantial modifica-
tions.6 Two major decisions of recent years have also expanded liability
in the case of interference with contracts or prospects by holding that
intent is no longer required and that negligence is sufficient.7 The tort
of wrongful discharge of an at will employee continues its developing
career as an economic claim as well.' And, as with the field of
defamation, you could well devote an extended discussion to any of
these matters.
On the personal injury front, you could dwell on the new cases
in which spoliation of evidence is recognized as a tort, 9 or in which
liability for mental distress is expanded, 0 or in which loss of con-
sortium claims are allowed on behalf of children when a parent is
injured," or a parent when a child is injured. 12 Or again, you could
5. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986). The decision allows recovery for
a satirical cartoon on the ground that, though it could not be actionable as libel because
it could not be taken to assert anything as a fact, it could nevertheless be actionable as
an intended infliction of mental distress. This appears to remove the protection given for
speech of a non-factual kind, that is, speech which asserts opinion, idea, comment or
even "rhetorical hyperbole." The case appears to extend liability also in common law
terms, since the usual infliction of mental distress case typically involves a vulnerable
plaintiff or a defendant who is in a position of power or authority over the plaintiff.
6. Cf. Malley v. Briggs, 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986) (civil rights action based on officer's
prosecution without probable cause; officer liable in spite of fact the magistrate found
probable cause and signed a warrant). Although courts have not yet recognized a tort of
"malicious defense," the California Supreme Court has in effect recognized a limited
version of such a tort. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36
Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
7. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979);
People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107
(1985). Other courts have so far adhered to a narrower rule. Cf. East River S.S. Corp.
v. Transamerican Delaval, 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986).
8. E.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985);
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
9. See Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); De Vera
v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 180 Cal. App. 3d 782, 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1986);
Smith v. Superior, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984); Henry v. Deen,
310 N.C. 75, 310 S.E.2d 326 (1984).
10. By dropping the traditional requirement that physical manifestations result from
the distress and by recognizing a tort in fact-patterns wholly unlike those used in the
past. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.,
831 (1980).
11. E.g., Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690
(1980).
12. Norvell v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 11 Ohio App. 3d 70, 463 N.E.2d 111 (1983).
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consider the expanded liabilities imposed by courts which have said
that the plaintiff might recover in some cases without proving cause
in fact by traditional standards 3 or the intense problems raised by
toxic torts-for example, the statute of limitations problem. 14 You
could discuss the innovative solution of one court which in effect
allows the plaintiff two causes of action for some toxic torts-one
for injuries that have occurred or which are likely to occur in the
future, and a separate cause of action to accrue later for any new
injuries that actually do occur.' 5 All this is enough without even
mentioning the expanded liabilities of those who serve alcohol to
others,' 6 or fail to protect plaintiffs from attacks by third persons. 7
On top of this enormous expansion of liability is the massive
counterattack in the form of numberless statutes passed under the
name of "tort reform" and aimed at reducing liabilities by one tech-
nique or another, sometimes by limiting liabilities for pain and suf-
fering or punitive damages," sometimes by limiting joint and several
liability,' 9 and sometimes by a variety of other means. 20
Faced with such a list of possible topics, the prudent thing for
any speaker to do is to avoid them all and to concentrate on basics
13. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983); Robertson
v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984). There is also the related "market
share" rule adopted in some courts for some types of causal problems. See, e.g., Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980);
McCormack v. Abbott Laboraties, 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985).
14. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986) (fear of future cancer from exposure to asbestos is
actionable as present injury).
15. Hagerty v. L. & L. Marine Serv. Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
16. See infra notes 86-87. I do not think Louisiana's new statute, 1986 La. Acts.
No. 17, will wholly avoid alcohol litigation. By its terms it does not exclude liability of
either the licensed seller or social host for providing alcohol to minors too young for
lawful purchase. Perhaps more importantly, it does not deal with claims now being asserted
in the cases elsewhere that police or others should have protected an injured person from
an intoxicated person. E.g., Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 514 A.2d 1257 (N.H. 1986).
Failure to protect a person already intoxicated may be another ground for liability not
excluded by the statute. See, pretermitting discussing of that possibility, Eldridge v.
Downtowner Hotel, 492 So. 2d 64 (La. 1986).
17. See infra notes 88-90.
18. 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 139 (creating new sections in Alaska Statute, Sec.
09.17.010 et seq) (limiting nonpecuniary damages to $500,000 with certain exceptions;
requiring clear and convincing evidence for punitive damages); 1986 Mass. Adv. Legis.
Serv. ch. 351 § 26 (Law Co-op.) ($500,000 limit in medical malpractice for certain
nonpecuniary damages in the absence of substantial impairment of bodily function or
disfigurement and other special circumstances).
19. 1986 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 305, § 401 (West) (several liability only with certain
exceptions).
20. E.g., 1986 La. Acts 17, § 1 (no liability for licensed sellers of alcohol for sale
to adult drinkers; similar rule as to social hosts).
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instead. Following such a plan, I want to suggest that the adoption
of comparative negligence in Louisiana as elsewhere gives renewed
significance to old legal concepts. We now must ask what contributory
negligence really means and when it should apply. We now must
consider causal concepts in a new light. We now must specify what
duties a defendant might owe a plaintiff under comparative negligence
to protect the plaintiff from his own fault.
But basic as these questions are, they have something in common
with many of the topics I mentioned earlier. These questions are
deeply concerned with accountability of actors who cause injury to
others and with self-responsibility of their victims.
I. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FAULT
A. Accountability as the Lodestone
The older idea of tort law, and the one that names it, is that
liability is imposed for wrongdoing. Let me call this the idea of
accountability: in a general and imperfect way, the idea is that everyone
should be accountable in law for his or her wrongs, but not otherwise.
In the last generation or a little more, many thinkers have shifted
their emphasis from accountability to compensation. They have become
less concerned with whether the defendant really deserves legal liability
because he was really at fault. They have become correspondingly
more concerned with finding a means of compensating the injured
plaintiff. 2'
Jurists interested in torts have also become interested in economic
analysis. Some of them would limit liabilities to achieve economic
efficiencies. 22 Others would expand liabilities to induce defendants to
create safer products or environments. 23 In these analyses, liability is
imposed for reasons of policy, to achieve some supposed public good,
rather than for reasons of justice, to assess just desserts.
Tort law is probably an extraordinarily expensive method of
achieving public good unless it also administers just desserts to the
21. E.g., 4 F. Harper, F. James, and 0. Gray, The Law of Torts § 25.1 (2d ed.
1986); Id. § 20.3, at 128. But cf. W.P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen,
Prosser On Torts § 4, at 20 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton On Torts].
22. The ordinary negligence rules, at least as interpreted under the well-known formula
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), could accomplish
economic efficiencies according to some analysis. See R. Posner, A Theory of Negligence,
1 J. Leg. Stud. 29 (1972).
23. E.g., G. Calabresi, The Costs Of Accidents (1970).
[Vol. 47
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parties. 24 Fortunately, the lodestone at the center of tort law is the
common belief that people ought to be held accountable for their
wrongs and correlatively responsible for themselves.
B. Comparative Negligence and Accountability
Comparative negligence reflects accountability principles. Com-
parative negligence is one expression of renewed concern for account-
ability. Adoption of a comparative negligence rule may increase the
number of instances in which a plaintiff recovers. It is therefore
sympathetic to the compensation ideal. But it is also exactly what you
would get if you sought accountability and only accountability.
Contributory negligence did not serve accountability principles.
Comparative negligence rules assert, as did the regime of contributory
negligence, that one is accountable not only for others, but for one's
self. Under the rule of contributory negligence you could make the
injured plaintiff accountable for his own misbehavior by applying the
contributory negligence bar. Or you could find a way to duck the
bar of contributory negligence, as in the case of last clear chance or
discovered peril, and if you did this, you could hold the defendant
accountable. But you never held both parties accountable. The plaintiff
recovered all damages, in spite of his fault, or the defendant escaped
all liability in spite of his fault. Either way the old regime served to
assure us that the ideal of personal accountability could not be fol-
lowed for both the faulty plaintiff and the faulty defendant.
How comparative negligence serves the fault principle. In contrast,
comparative negligence holds each party to a liability proportioned to
his respective fault. If the plaintiff is the only injured party, for
instance, and he is guilty of 40% of the negligence, he must bear
4006 of the damages-his own, in that case. The defendant guilty of
600o of the negligence must bear 60% of the damages. Although the
amount of damages may vary enormously from case to case, liability
for those damages is nonetheless proportioned to fault under the
comparative negligence scheme, at least in the case of the pure com-
parative negligence. 21
24. Exact costs figures for the judicial resolution of disputes are not available, but
it does seem clear that there are many costs, both tangible and intangible. See Dobbs,
Can We Care For People and Still Count the Costs?, 46 Md. L. Rev. 401 (1986). In
personal injury cases, the high cost of shifting the loss from one party to another,
including investigation costs, lawyers' fees, and public costs of the judicial system, compares
unfavorably with the relatively low cost of covering injury by private insurance-unless
the tort system provides intangible benefits by providing justice.
25. The "modified" comparative negligence schemes fail to reflect accountability
proportioned to fault in those cases in which the plaintiff's fault is equal to or greater
1987]
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II. COMPARATIVE FAULT: EFFECTS ON RELATED DOCTRINES
Two groups of effects. But the effects of adopting comparative
negligence are not always predictable. I would like to suggest that the
change from contributory negligence system to a comparative negli-
gence system will have several kinds of effects. These fall roughly in
two groups. The first group has to do with doctrines related to
contributory fault but once thought to be quite distinguishable from
it. A glance at some of these will suffice here.
Assumed risk. Assumed risk, for example, comes under renewed
analysis when comparative negligence is adopted. This was once re-
garded as a defense wholly distinct from the contributory negligence
defense. The adoption of comparative negligence tends to force us to
recognize that assumed risk really seems to mean several different
things. In some cases to say the plaintiff had assumed the risk really
meant that the defendant was under no duty to the plaintiff, or that
if he was then he was not negligent at all. In other cases to say that
the plaintiff assumed a risk was really merely an emphatic way of
saying he was guilty of contributory negligence.2 6 Adoption of com-
than that of the defendant. Although these systems of comparative fault do not directly
reflect theoretically perfect accountability as in the pure system, they might nevertheless
be thought to represent a judgment about self-responsibility. They might also represent
one short-cut method of reaching issues dealt with in the First Hypothetical. See text
accompanying infra notes 39-44. Because the modified system of comparative negligence
cuts off many potential plaintiffs, however, it retains, for those plaintiffs, the characteristics
of the old regime in which contributory negligence is a complete bar. For this reason,
you might carry over into a modified system of comparative negligence some of the
meliorating rules, including a duty-risk analysis. The comments below as to what rules
should be carried over into comparative negligence systems thus deal only with pure
comparative negligence systems.
26. The best collection of materials on the idea that assumed risk is always capable
of being expressed as contributory negligence, no-duty or no-negligence, is still the Sym-
posium: Assumption of Risk, 22 La. L. Rev. 1 (1961). See generally, Prosser & Keeton
On Torts § 68.
Example: Plaintiff in an isolated rural area has a heart attack, borrows medicine from
his neighbor, defendant, who has a similar heart problem. Defendant warns him he fears
the medicine is contaminated, but as the attack is severe and help is hours away, plaintiff
decides to risk it. In fact the medicine is contaminated and the plaintiff suffers some
bad effects from it. Older cases might have denied the plaintiff's recovery on assumed
risk grounds. Probably most thinkers would now agree that recovery should be denied,
but on the ground that the defendant has violated no duty to the plaintiff; he is not
negligent at all.
In other cases there is a genuine, if unspoken understanding that the risks are shifted
to the plaintiff, and where such an understanding, if written, would not be against public
policy, an oral understanding of this kind would negate the defendants' duty. This seems
particularly appropriate where the plaintiff is in as good a position as the defendant to
secure safety. Sometimes courts under comparative negligence regimes have seemed to say
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parative negligence makes it important to know which meaning we
have in mind. The result is that the assumed risk doctrine is being
redistributed, so that its core ideas will, under comparative negligence,
be handled under the doctrines of contributory negligence or where
appropriate, "no duty. '27. We are gradually finding that we can do
without the term and give more precise expressions to its meanings
by using quite different expressions.
Avoidable consequences. A second related doctrine is that of avoid-
able consequences-the rule that you must use reasonable care to
minimize your damages. As with assumed risk, this doctrine is some-
times really indistinguishable from contributory negligence and I feel
sure that the courts will in some cases treat the failure to minimize
damages as a species of contributory fault that will merely reduce
damages under comparative negligence. 21 In other cases of avoidable
consequences-those in which the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct re-
sults in identifiable additional damages-I think the old rules may be
retained with the result that the plaintiff would be responsible for
that the plaintiff's conduct will be treated as contributory negligence and damages merely
reduced unless the "assumption of risk" was express. E.g., Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho
984, 695 P.2d 369 (1985). Cf. Arbegast v. Board of Educ., 65 N.Y.2d 161, 480 N.E.2d
365 (1985) (donkey baseball; one may contractually limit liability even after merger of
assumed risk with comparative negligence). But perhaps the form of assumed risk is less
important here than its actual communication, which quite often is not by words but by
conduct. Just as one might have a genuine contract in which the terms were understood
as a result of acts and customs, a willingness to assume a risk and to relieve the defendant
of liability could be shown by conduct in some cases. And if the defendant is led reasonably
to believe that his conduct is acceptable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's subjective and
unreasonable belief to the contrary should not operate to impose liability upon the
defendant. I judge some courts would not accept this last statement. See Kuehner v.
Green, 436 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1983).
In still other cases what passed as assumed risk seems to be ordinary negligence and
would be subject now to rules of comparative negligence rather than to a rule of complete
bar. Example: Plaintiff, under no compulsion to do so, accepts a ride with a driver whom
he knows sometimes drives too fast. If the plaintiff's decision to accept the ride is not
unreasonably risky he should not be barred or suffer a reduction of damages; his conduct
is contributory fault or nothing. If his decision to ride with the dangerous driver is
unreasonably risky, he is guilty of contributory fault and his damages should be reduced
in a comparative negligence system. There is no occasion in such cases to use the term
assumed risk.
27. "[T]he adoption of a system of comparative fault should, where it applies, entail
the merger of the defenses of misuse and assumption of risk into the general scheme of
assessment of liability in proportion to fault." Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166
(La. 1985). All of the cases cited in supra note 26 also support use of comparative
negligence analysis in some, though not all, of the old "assumed risk" cases.
28. See Uniform Comparative Fault Act § l(b); Phillips, The Case for Judicial
Adoption of Comparative Fault in South Carolina, 32 S.C.L. Rev. 295, 310 (1980).
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any additional losses he suffers that can be separately measured. 29
Causation. Application of traditional rules. A third related doctrine
is that of causation. In most cases the causal principles worked out
before the advent of comparative negligence will continue to apply;
the defendant's fault that is not causal will not be counted against
him, and likewise the plaintiff's contributory negligence that is not
causal will not reduce the plaintiff's damages.30 In these respects
causation remains unaffected by the adoption of comparative negli-
gence.
New causal approaches. But there are cases in which new causal
concepts may be used. When you cannot really compare the fault of
the plaintiff and defendant, you might have to make some kind of
causal comparison instead. For example, if the defendant is strictly
liable and the plaintiff is negligent, 3 fault is not a common denom-
29. Ability to separate damages caused by the plaintiff's fault from those caused by
defendant's fault is perhaps one of the key elements that might distinguish "true" avoidable
consequences cases from the pseudo-avoidable cases that are really contributory negligence
cases in disguise. Where no separation can be made, apportionment on the basis of relative
fault under the comparative negligence system is the most reasonable allotment of the
costs of injury. Where separation can be made, the plaintiff should often be required to
absorb the losses she has inflicted upon herself. For example, if the defendant negligently
breaks the plaintiff's leg and cuts her hand, the defendant should be liable for these
damages with reduction for the plaintiff's comparative fault. If the plaintiff unreasonably
refuses to apply antiseptic to the cut or to have her leg set, so that her hand becomes
infected and she walks with a limp, the plaintiff should not recover for the infection and
the limp at all. This result is quite similar to the result you would expect in concurrent
tortfeasor cases where there is no concert and no other special basis for liability. It is
the inability to separate the damages that warrants the joint and several liability in such
cases, so that if A breaks the plaintiff's leg and B simultaneously breaks the plaintiff's
arm, each is liable for the harm he has done. In the avoidable consequences cases,
"proximate cause" reasoning might produce the same result suggested here.
30. See infra notes 46-47. See also Eaglin v. State Farm Ins. Co., 489 So. 2d 464
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (full recovery by plaintiff on the ground her negligence if any
was not a cause); Forest v. State, 493 So. 2d 563 (La. 1986) (decedent "not guilty of
any form of 'fault' by which the plaintiffs' judgment should either be denied or reduced
.. [his] statutory violation did not constitute a cause in fact of the accident").
In Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967 (La. 1985), the Supreme
Court of Louisiana appeared to support the idea of some degree of causal apportionment,
directing the trier to consider "both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and
the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed." I read
this to be consistent with the idea that fault which is not causal at all cannot be the
basis for a defendant's liability or a plaintiff's reduction in damages. I feel quite unsure
about the extent to which it might be read to authorize a causal apportionment that is
inconsistent with an apportionment of negligence or fault.
31. The possibility of some kind of comparative "fault" reduction is recognized in
this situation by a number of courts. E.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). The general use of comparative "fault"
in cases where negligence and strict liability are combined does not, however, foreclose
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inator that would permit you to assign percentages of responsibility.
Instead of trying to compare non-existent fault in this situation, you
might try comparing causation instead. That is, you might try com-
paring the causal significance of the defendant's non-negligent conduct
with the causal significance of the plaintiff's negligent conduct. Since
we do in fact rate causal significance quite routinely in tort law when
we make proximate cause assessments, I do not think comparative
causation is an impossible task. But I do think it is very likely to
diminish any real requirement that plaintiffs exercise a degree of
responsibility for themselves.
There are ways to avoid the appearance of causal comparisons.
In a products liability case, for example, you can say that though the
defendant was not negligent because it did not know of the defect
or of the risks of a product design, it is nevertheless strictly liable.
You can then by fiction assume that the defdndant had knowledge
of the risks and ask what its share of fault would be under that
fictional assumption.12 This would represent a convenient way to think
about the problem, but a comparison of the plaintiff's real negligence
with the defendant's imputed or fictional negligence is not likely to
focus the mind on the plaintiff's responsibility for his own well-being.
In fact, it may be nothing more than a species of comparative causation
in which the relative causal strength of the parties' conduct is measured
by assessing the relative strength of the risks they took, whether those
risks were negligently taken or not. 33 A comparative negligence system,
the possibility that the contributorily negligent plaintiff will recover full, undiminished
damages in certain cases. This can occur, for example, where the defendant's product is
defective for the very reason that it subjects the plaintiff to harm from his own carelessness.
See Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985), and the discussion in text
accompanying infra notes 52-85.
32. Dean Keeton uses a similar formula in determining defectiveness of product design.
See Prosser & Keeton On Torts § 99. Cf. LaJaunie v. Metropolitan Property & Liab.
Ins. Co., 481 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (presuming knowledge of the risk
by the strict liability defendant in order to balance risks and determine unreasonableness).
33. See Rizzo and Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic
Theory, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1399 (1980). Rizzo and Arnold propose a model for comparing
causation which would work in a system in which all liability was strict; as far as I can
see, it would work equally well where the liability of one party is based on negligence
and the other on strict responsibility. The Rizzo and Arnold theory attempts to assess
risks created by parties in terms of probability, not in terms of risk-utility balancing.
Thus A may create a probability of .90 that the decedent will be killed. B may create
a probability of .45 that decedent will be killed. The two causes operating together may
result in fact in the decedent's death. A's responsibility would be twice that of B's if
both were strictly liable. A similar process could be used to allocate responsibilities between
the defendant and the plaintiff who is guilty of contributory fault. The probabilities
supposed are only estimates; but perhaps they are no less reliable than estimates of
negligence in an ordinary comparative negligence case. They do, however, focus on
1987]
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when coupled with strict liability systems, is likely to introduce at
least this much deviation from traditional causal concepts. The de-
viation is likely to be accompanied by loss of focus on the plaintiff's
own responsibility.
III. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: EFFECTS ON PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY
A. The Possibilities
Adoption of comparative negligence may have a second group of
effects. These have to do mainly with the effects of the plaintiff's
fault on his recovery or the amount of it. I want to concentrate on
some, but not all34 of these effects.
Recovery with diminished damages. First, in some situations the
plaintiff under the old regime would have been barred entirely by
contributory negligence; but under the new dispensation his contrib-
utory fault will merely diminish his damages. This will be the most
common effect and one that requires no discussion here."
Plaintiff is still barred. Second, in some cases the plaintiff would
be barred by what in the past we called contributory negligence; under
comparative negligence the plaintiff will still be barred because we
probabilities rather than fault, which suits the purposes of Rizzo and Arnold, but leaves
me with the feeling that the element of accountability for fault may be lost in this process.
34. For instance, the traditional rule applied in some states that claims based on
intentional torts, and by extension, willful and wanton or reckless torts, would not be
defeated by the plaintiff's contributory fault. E.g., Harlow v. Connelly, 548 S.W.2d 143
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977). If this carries over after comparative fault, the plaintiff would
recover unreduced damages. The matter is discussed in V. Schwartz, Comparative Neg-
ligence §5.3 (2d ed. 1986). A related question is whether to retain the common law rule
that contributory negligence is no bar to an intentional tort. In the light of the courts'
willingness to compare the plaintiff's fault with the defendant's non-fault in strict liability
cases, see supra notes 31-33, a comparison of the defendant's intentional fault and the
plaintiff's negligent fault is surely possible. For example, the plaintiff who walks out of
a store without paying for an item might be arrested or prosecuted by the storeowner.
If the storeowner is held liable in a malicious prosecution or false imprisonment suit, as
in, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 284 Ark. 345, 681 S.W.2d 359 (1984), it
may not be unreasonable to suggest that the plaintiff should bear some responsibility for
having left without paying. Some courts have raised another related possibility by suggesting
that a single act or course of conduct by the defendant could be both negligence and an
intentional tort, perhaps giving the plaintiff an option to emphasize the intentional aspect
and avoid any reduction. See Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (no reduction). See also Ghassemieh v. Scafer, 52 Md. App. 31, 447 A.2d 84 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
35. There are many cases working out the math. E.g., Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d
532 (Wyo. 1979) (plaintiff's damages found to be $10,000, plaintiff's negligence 49%,
recovery $5100). See generally H. Woods, Comparative Fault (1978 and Supp. 1986).
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will perceive that the real reason for denying recovery was that the
defendant was not negligent at all.16
Plaintiff makes a full, undiminished recovery. Third, in some cases
under the old system the plaintiff might have had a recovery in spite
of his contributory negligence; under comparative negligence he might
still recover undiminished damages.1
7
Directions of these comments. Which of these results-diminished
damages, no recovery at all, or undiminished recovery-is to be reached
in a given case will require analysis which is best begun with some
case-situations. From these, perhaps, we can get some guidance in
principle if not in precise rule. Because the most familiar and least
controversial case is one in which the plaintiff's damages are simply
diminished in proportion to the plaintiff's fault, I will not take up
cases that illustrate that idea at all. Instead, let me concentrate on
the two other kinds of cases.
But first I want to acknowledge that the two main ideas here-
that in some cases after comparative negligence the plaintiff may still
recover nothing and that in other cases the plaintiff might recover
undiminished damages-were first developed by Professor Wex S.
Malone, one of the great elder statesmen of tort law.38
My acknowledgement to Wex Malone can never be enough. Never-
theless, this is the time to turn to the details.
B. Plaintiff is Completely Barred
1. The First Hypothetical. Let's begin with a simple and very
old situation. Suppose:
Defendant, a homeowner, is doing some work on his house
and for this purpose has a pallet of bricks delivered and placed
in the street next to the side of his house. While the bricks
are piled there, the plaintiff rides his motorcycle down the
street and runs into the bricks, causing serious injury to him-
self.
Two grounds for denying liability. In the old regime of contrib-
utory negligence the plaintiff might lose his case for either of two
reasons. The judge might say that he is guilty of contributory neg-
ligence and should be barred for that reason. Or the judge might say
that the defendant was not negligent at all, since, after all, bricks
36. See text accompanying infra notes 39-44.
37. See text accompanying infra notes 52-85.
38. See Malone, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 930 (1968) and
Malone, Some Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 91, reprinted
in W. Malone, Essays On Torts 197 (1986).
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that can be observed and avoided really do not represent any unrea-
sonable hazard. They are no greater hazard than a car, motorcycle
or bike parked in the same spot.3 9 In all such cases the defendant
creates an obstruction, but one that is not much of a risk, since the
defendant knows it is visible to others and easily avoidable. The
defendant's reasonable expectation is that others using the road can
and will take care of themselves.
Choice of grounds was insignificant under old regime. In the old
regime, it made no difference whether you looked at this as a case
of contributory negligence or as a case in which the defendant was
not negligent at all. Both ways of looking at the case would yield
the same result-dismissal of the case.
But significant under the new. Under the new dispensation, how-
ever, if you look at this as a case of contributory negligence, you
allow the plaintiff to recover and merely reduce his damages. But if
you look at it as a case in which the defendant is not negligent at
all, you will dismiss the claim entirely.
Analysis without considering contributory fault. The very earliest
of contributory negligence cases was in this fact pattern. The plaintiff's
claim was dismissed in Butterfield v. Forrester4 ° when he rode his
horse into building materials left by the homeowner in the road. The
case has long been regarded as establishing the rule of contributory
negligence. Yet as the redoubtable Wex Malone has pointed out, 41
such a case might well have meant that the defendant breached no
duty to the plaintiff at all. The point is not limited to the exact facts
in the First Hypothetical, so it may be worthwhile to attempt to state
the general principle.
39. Thus it is usually the owner of the parked car, or its occupants, who recovers
from the driver who strikes the car, as in, e.g., Handy v. Cheatum, 410 So. 2d 322 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1982); Petite v. Richardson, 347 So. 2d 23 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977);
Holleman v. Viola, 330 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). Cf. Laird v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972). Negligence opn the part of the car owner may
be found if he violates a statute, as in Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So.
2d 821 (1971), and likewise if there is insufficient room to pass safely, see Haas v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 321 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975), or the
obstruction is not readily visible so that the traveler cannot avoid the risk. Degeneres v.
Pan-American Petroleum Corp., 153 So. 481 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934) (plaintiff was
injured on a small intake pipe installed in the way by a service station and sticking up
only 2 1/2 inches). The traditional view is that abutting landowners, if not others, are
entitled to use the street in reasonable ways in connection with use of the land, as by
loading and unloading and stacking building materials. Van O'Linda v. Lothrop, 38 Mass.
(21 Pick) 292 (1838); John A. Tolman & Co. v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 268, 88 N.E.
488 (1909).
40. 11 East. 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
41. Supra note 38.
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2. Formulating the Principle of the First Hypothetical
Expressions of the principle. The general idea that the defendant
is not legally accountable to the plaintiff at all in the First Hypothetical
gan be expressed in several different ways. You can say that the
defendant was under no duty to the plaintiff, or that he breached no
duty, or that he was under no duty with respect to the risk involved,
or that the defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause of the
harm 4 2 or, most simply of all, that the defendant was not negligent.
No negligence; negligence toward other classes. I prefer the simple
no-negligence statement on the facts of the First Hypothetical and
Butterfield v. Forrester for the very reason that it is the simplest
statement. But if you push me, I will have to admit that it must be
qualified. I think the homeowner is not negligent toward the plaintiff,
but I have to admit that he might be negligent toward someone in
some respect or another. The homeowner might have created an un-
reasonable risk to a blind neighbor who walks the street, or to a
cyclist biking up the road at night.
Scope of risk and proximate cause expressions. Nevertheless, a
risk toward someone else or a risk of some kind of harm that did
not in fact occur is, as far as the plaintiff is legitimately concerned,
no risk at all. As a result, the defendant is still not liable to the
plaintiff in this particular case. This is where some other expressions
might be helpful. You can say that the defendant was indeed negligent,
but that the harm was not within the scope of the risk; or that the
duty of the defendant did not extend to the risk of a sighted driver
running into an open and obvious obstruction; 43 or that the defendant
42. This logically includes the statement that the plaintiff's own conduct or that of
a third person was "the sole proximate cause" of the harm, since in such cases the
defendant's conduct is not a proximate cause. When a court says that the plaintiff's
conduct is the "sole proximate cause," however, there is a risk that the focus is on
plaintiff fault and not on causation in some more neutral sense. If what is really in issue
is the plaintiff's fault, the comparative negligence rules should apply. If what is really
in issue is causation, the focus should be on the idea that the defendant's conduct is not
causal rather than that the plaintiff's conduct is.
43. 1 hasten to add that not all cases of open and obvious danger are susceptible
to this conclusion. Suppose plaintiff owns land next to the railroad, which negligently
emits sparks all along its track, creating a risk of fire. Plaintiff knows this but insists
on his right to use his own land. This he does by storing materials used in his business
on his land. If the defendant has no right to impose the risk on the plaintiff, it cannot
be said that the plaintiff is expected to take care of himself. If you add that the defendant
took an unreasonable risk of fire, then you conclude that the defendant was negligent
even though the risk was known to the plaintiff and was "open and obvious." Cf. Leroy
Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 345 S. Ct. 415 (1914). The
same would be true in the case of simultaneous action on the highway if defendant,
driving the forward car engages in a series of dangerous sudden halts, running the risk
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was negligent, but to a very different class of persons, such as blind
persons; or you could even say that the defendant's negligence was
not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm.
44
Effect of comparative fault; accountability. All of the expressions
carry a common connotation-that the defendant's fault, if any, is
not fault directed toward the injury that happened or the person
injured. And whatever the expression, the comparative negligence stat-
ute should not change the result-the defendant, whose fault, if any,
that the plaintiff, driving the following car will not be able to stop in time. The plaintiff
may be guilty of contributory fault if he does not in fact stop in time, but it cannot be
said that the defendant is not negligent in such a case. He has imposed upon the plaintiff
a: risk which he cannot expect the plaintiff will always avoid and a risk that, on the
public highway, he has no right to impose. The case in the First Hypothetical differs
from these examples in that landowners usually are permitted to make use of roadways
adjacent to their land, as are those who park cars there. In other words the landowner
in the First Hypothetical has the right to create a situation in which the traveler must
protect himself. Put another way, the landowner there would meet his duty of reasonable
care by giving a warning of the danger. Since the danger there gives its own warning on
most city streets, his duty of care is fulfilled. But the defendant driving on the highway
does not meet his duty of care by warning that he is about to be negligent, nor does
the railroad meet its duty by announcing that it intends to spray sparks. Other defendants,
such as the defendant in the Third Hypothetical, likewise must do more for safety than
give a warning. See infra note 52. Where that is the case the conclusion that the landowner
in the First Hypothetical in not negligent at all will not be reached.
44. Although the duty/risk terminology might be preferred because it leads to less
confusion or to more penetrating analysis, the statement that there is "no proximate
cause" very often means that the injury was not within the scope of the defendant's
duty, or that he was not negligent. The terms are thus to a large extent potentially
interchangeable if correctly defined. See Nelson v. Powers, 402 So. 2d 129 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1981) (instruction in terms of proximate cause was not error if instruction conveyed
the correct legal ideas). Thus in the obvious danger cases one might easily shift from
"no negligence" or "no duty" to "no proximate cause." Since darkness is an obvious
danger in itself, Shafouk Nor El Din Hamza v. Bourgeois, 493 So. 2d 112 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1986), is a good example. There the street was not lit and the victim was struck
by a car. The court observed that if "Shafouk was on the roadway when struck, the
sole proximate case of the accident was the failure of Shafouk to exercise reasonable care
for his own safety . . . . Although the Police Jury may have a duty to protect a pedestrian
using the sidewalk from injury caused by defects therein, it has no duty to provide and/
or maintain sidewalks to protect him from the risks involved in walking the roadway,
particularly in a rural area as was involved here. Neither the absence of nor defects in
the sidewalk or shoulder were legal causes for the victim's injuries." 493 So. 2d at 121.
The shift back and forth between proximate cause and scope-of-risk expressions seems
entirely understandable and predictable.
Compare also the obvious danger-sitting on a balcony railing in a hotel-in Eldridge
v. Downtowner Hotel, 492 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986), where recovery was denied
on a duty/risk analysis with the comment that some risks are responsibilities for his own
safety, but where the court also explained its views by saying that "plaintiff's fall was
in fact caused by his own want of skill, that is, in exercising bad judgment by sitting
on the railing and in losing his balance," 492 So. 2d at 65 (emphasis by the court)-a
causal form of expression.
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is wholly irrelevant to this case, is not liable at all. Both the rule of
shared liability under comparative negligence and the rule of no li-
ability belong in the jurisprudence of torts if we are really to respect
accountability for fault as a principle.
Comparative fault; compelling re-analysis. More specifically, com-
parative negligence systems increase the pressure on concepts of duty,
negligence and causation, any one of which might bar the plaintiff
completely. Cases we once considered to be cases of contributory
negligence must now be re-analyzed to determine whether, after all,
they are really cases of no duty, no negligence or no causation. This
re-analysis compels a complete vindication of the defendant in cases
like the First Hypothetical. But in others, re-analysis may work the
opposite result by allowing a full recovery by the plaintiff.
C. Plaintiff Suffers No Reduction in Damages
1. The Second Hypothetical
I want to turn now to cases in which the plaintiff not only may
recover in spite of his own fault but in which he may even recover
full, unreduced damages. Consider:
Decedent, who has always lived in the north, is invited to
stay in the defendant's home located in a warm southern state
where patio swimming pools are quite common. But suppose
that the decedent is unaware that pools are common or that
the homeowner has one. Arriving at night, the decedent accepts
his host's invitation to make himself at home: he steps out
on the patio in the dark and falls into the pool. Unable to
swim, he drowns before the host-defendant discovers the ac-
cident.
An action for wrongful death is brought against the host-homeowner.
The claim is that he was negligent in failing to warn or to light the
patio.4" The defense is contributory fault of the decedent.
45. Under traditional common law rules the questions of contributory negligence in
the land-owner-guest setting were often obscured by the rules limiting the landowner's
duties to licensees and trespassers. But even a mere licensee, such as a social guest, is
entitled under the common law rules to a warning of dangers when the landowner knows
the licensee's presence and also knows of the proximity of the danger. See Prosser &
Keeton On Torts §§ 58, 60. Under the more liberal rule in which reasonable care is owed
to licensees as well as invitees, and sometimes even to trespassers, it is even easier to see
that the homeowner may be negligent in failing to warn. The grandparent case is Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). Its reasoning was
approved in Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976), cert.
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No contributory negligence; comparing the First Hypothetical. If
the particular facts justify the conclusion that the defendant home-
owner is negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff of the pool, then
the case is a very easy one. It is, in fact, the exact reverse of the
First Hypothetical. The defendant was not negligent in the First Hy-
pothetical because he had every reason to expect that the plaintiff
could see the materials in the road and take care of himself. By the
same token, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in that case
because he could have taken care of himself but did not. But in the
Second Hypothetical, if the defendant is found negligent at all, it will
be because his failure to provide a warning prevented the decedent
from taking appropriate safety steps. In such a case, depending on
the exact shadings of fact, the decedent may be found not to be
negligent at all. And in that case the plaintiff suing for his death
should have a full recovery.
Plaintiff negligent vis-a-vis some risks. In the First Hypothetical
I said I thought it would be best to explain the defendant's lack of
liability by saying simply that he was not negligent at all, but that
there would be cases where more complex explanations would be
required. Much the same kind of observation can be made here. It
is easiest to explain the plaintiff's full recovery in the Second Hy-
pothetical by saying that the decedent was not guilty of contributory
negligence at all. But I must confess that if you push me, I will have
to say that the decedent in the Second Hypothetical might well have
been contributorily negligent toward some risks, just as the defendant
in the First Hypothetical might have been negligent toward blind
walkers when he left the building materials in the road.
-Examples; full recovery. In the Second Hypothetical, for ex-
ample, we can imagine that the decedent, blundering in the dark patio
of a strange house did create some definite risks to himself. He could
easily have tripped on a tricycle, bumped into a tree or scraped himself
on a thorny hedge. But a trier of fact might well find that drowning
- in an unexpected pool of water is not within the risks that made his
conduct negligent in the first place. If such a finding is made and
justified, then a full and undiminished recovery for death of the
decedent would be justified. Perhaps some courts would express this
denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976). There are, of course, other grounds for landowner liabilities
in Louisiana under rules like those explained in Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La.
1975). Even if strict liability were applied on the facts of the Second Hypothetical, however,
I think it would not change the analysis; victim fault, if it is otherwise an appropriate
consideration, would not be excluded under the strict liability rule. See La Jaunie v.
Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 481 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
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idea by saying that the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence,
but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of his death. 46
-Schwartz' view. Professor Schwartz is suspicious of this rea-
soning. 47 He suggests that courts should be leery of old contributory
negligence cases allowing the plaintiff a full recovery on such grounds.
He has some good reasons for suspicion because it is all too easy to
manipulate descriptions of the risks so as to make it seem that one's
fault does not encompass a particular risk. 4 To the extent that courts
might have manipulated the proximate cause concept under the old
regime of contributory negligence, I think Professor Schwartz is right.
There is simply no need for such verbal shenanigans after the adoption
of comparative negligence rules.
-A Qualified Agreement. But if you apply a risk analysis to a
defendant's conduct, limiting liability of a defendant to harms resulting
from risks that made his conduct negligent in the first place, then it
is entirely appropriate to apply a risk analysis to the plaintiff's conduct
as well. The right result, I think, is to apply the risk analysis honestly,
both when analyzing defendant-created risks and when analyzing plain-
tiff-created risks. If risk description is spare and general, the descrip-
tion will encompass many variations, 49 as it should, and the actor will
be held accountable for all the variations as well as the most obvious
and central risks of his conduct.
-Applied to the Second Hypothetical. If I try to apply this idea
to the Second Hypothetical, I lean toward Professor Schwartz' po-
46. See Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co., 59 Conn. 261, 21 A. 924 (1890) (injury to
plaintiff was not within the scope of the risk that made his conduct contributorily negligent).
The same "proximate cause" answer might be given even if the court does not use scope-
of-risk analysis. See Kubik v. Ingleheart, 280 Ark. 310, 657 S.W. 2d 545 (1983) (plaintiff
operating boat negligently shot by defendant, boat's operation not a "direct cause" of
plaintiff's harm, hence no reduction under comparative negligence). The facts in Kubik
are sketchy, but it would seem that the identical answer would be given under a scope-
of-risk version of "proximate cause." See also supra note 30.
47. V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 4.5 (2d ed. 1986). Cf. H. Woods, Com-
parative Fault § 5.1 (1978 and Supp. 1986).
48. Compare Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837 (H.L.) (risk of fire includes
risk of explosion) with Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., Ltd., [1964] 1 Q.B. 518 (C.A. 1963)
(risk of splashing molten metal when object is dropped in it does not include risk of
eruption due to chemical reaction with the object).
49. See R. Keeton, Legal Cause (1963). Compare Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting
Corp., 51 N.Y. 2d 308, 434 N.Y.S. 2d 166, 414 N.E. 2d 666 (1980) (worker placed at
forward end of excavation protected by inadequate barrier "ignited into a fire ball" when
driver who forgot his medicine suffered a seizure and ran into kettle of liquid enamel in
the excavation; contractor's negligence as to barricade a proximate cause of injury) with
Charles v. Lavergne, 412 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (worker splicing new cable
on old one on a pole, defendant drove truck over the cable on the ground, entangling
it in axle and pulling on the pole, which broke and threw worker to the ground; driver's
negligence did not create this specific risk). See also supra note 48.
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sition. Decedent created risks of injury to himself from unknown
dangers in the dark. The most likely of these would be dangers of a
minor sort-scratches, bumps, falls. The strongest distinction between
the drowning that actually occurred and the risks that the decedent
accepted is that of magnitude, not kind. This in turn is a strong
argument for letting comparative negligence work its wonders." Unless
you have an enormous distrust of the trier of fact, the trier's deter-
mination as a fact will be simpler and perhaps fairer than an attempt
to resolve the question by a legal risk analysis. The trier can readily
recognize that the risks created by the decedent were small risks of
small harm and reduce damages by the smallest fraction. This seems
to me preferable to an elaborate risk analysis in a very close case.
-A qualified disagreement. Nevertheless, there are surely cases in
which the risk analysis has its'place and in which the plaintiff should
not only recover but should recover in full.
2. Variation on the Second Hypothetical
Suppose the guest in the Second Hypothetical is warned:
"Don't go on the patio, you might fall in the pool and my
lights aren't working." The guest steps out on the patio an-
yway, 6 ut instead of falling into the pool is struck by his
host's car, which the host has improperly parked and which
rolls downhill and crashes through the patio wall, striking the
decedent and killing him."
In this case the guest is perhaps as much guilty of contributory
negligence as in the Second Hypothetical, but the risks he is taking-
risks such as falling and even falling into a pool-are surely of a
very different order than the risk of being struck by a car. This is
not merely because the risk of being struck by a car suggests a danger
of greater magnitude, but because no one would have said that the
decedent's conduct increased his risk of being struck by a car at all.
In this case I believe the plaintiff should recover fully for decedent's
death and I believe that in cases involving parallel conduct by defend-
ants you would reach a similar conclusion.
50. If the actor is otherwise responsible for his negligence, the fact that the harm
that occurs is more extensive than that foreseen or foreseeable does not relieve him of
responsibility under generally accepted rules. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435
(1965). He escapes liability on a risk analysis only if the harm is of a different kind than
the harm that was foreseeable.
51. The structure of the situation is suggested by Smithwick v. Hall & Upson Co.,
59 Conn. 261, 21 A. 924 (1890), but the particular facts are adapted to present a variation
on the Second Hypothetical.
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Analysis, not rules. In other words, the question whether a given
case calls for a comparative negligence treatment or whether it calls
instead for allowing a full recovery because the plaintiff was not
negligent as to the kinds of risks that caused him harm depends on
the facts of each case, and analysis rather than mechanical application
of the rules is required.
The comparative fault choice in close cases. Close cases, however,
need not call for difficulties. Doubts can readily be resolved in favor
of a comparative negligence solution in all but the clearest cases. I
say this because, although we should construct rules to minimize the
risk of harm through undetected judicial error, the harms from an
erroneous decision to apply risk analysis and the harms from an
erroneous decision to apply comparative negligence are approximately
equal and both are likely to be small. If, contrary to my recommen-
dation, you were to apply a risk analysis to the Second Hypothetical,
you would allow the plaintiff to make a full and undiminished recovery
in spite of the decedent's negligence; but the difference between a
full recovery and a diminished recovery in such a close case is not
likely to be a very great one because the trier would almost certainly
not have made a very large reduction in damages had the case pro-
ceeded upon a comparative negligence basis. The trier would very
probably have reasoned that the decedent's negligence in risking a
slip, bump or scratch is very minor compared to negligence of the
homeowner who risks the guest's drowning and consequently damages
would have been little reduced. And similarly, the risk from an er-
roneous decision to apply comparative negligence in the Variation
would probably also be small. If the trier attempts to reduce damages
in the Variation, when in an ideal world there would be no reduction,
nevertheless the reduction is again likely to be a small one, and on
the same kind of reasoning: the plaintiff's risk of a bump in the dark
is very different from the defendant's risk that someone will be killed
by an improperly parked and braked car.
-Comparative fault efficiency over risk analysis. Because the risks
of error are both small and approximately equal it is probably more
efficient to leave the doubtful case to the trier of fact under a com-
parative negligence rule. This would avoid the relatively elaborate
judicial machinery of argumentation, briefs, opinion-writing and anal-
ysis over the question of risk-analysis in favor of the relatively simple
decision of a jury or trier of fact. Thus my conclusion would be that
if the risk created by the plaintiff is clearly of a different order and
not merely a different magnitude, a full recovery is in order and the
trier should be so instructed; but that in any other case, including
all doubtful cases, the trier should be instructed on comparative fault
instead.
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3. The Third Hypothetical
The third hypothetical case is very different. Suppose that:
A manufacturing company hires a worker to engage in a
simple but repetitive and boring task. He is to place a piece
of metal under a drill press, then activate the press with a
foot pedal so that it comes down on the metal and molds it
or cuts it or drills a hole in it. There is no safety device to
prevent the worker from getting his hands under the drill when
it comes down, and after hours of this boring work he reaches
in to straighten the metal piece just as he hits the pedal with
his foot. The result is a hand crushed or drilled through or
cut off.5 2
Compared to the First Hypothetical. This kind of case, as factually
different as it is from the First Hypothetical, is similar on one point:
the plaintiff knows the danger and the defendant knows he knows.
The argument made in the First Hypothetical is that since the defend-
ant knew the plaintiff would appreciate the danger, the defendant was
not negligent in allowing that danger to exist; indeed, that it was not
much of a danger at all because it could readily be avoided by the
plaintiff.
Contrasted with the First Hypothetical. But the differences are
more important than the similarities. In the Third Hypothetical, the
defendant can easily be found guilty of negligence in failing to protect
the plaintiff by providing a machine suitably designed and safe. It is
cheap and easy to set the machine so that it will not operate at all
unless two buttons are simultaneously pressed by hand-a strategy
that can avoid all but the most determined efforts to get a hand under
the drill. The defendant should surely take this precaution.
Protecting the plaintiff from his own fault. Given that a finding
of negligence against the defendant would be justified, the focus of
the case would necessarily turn to the contributory negligence of the
worker. And here is a very big difference between the First Hypo-
thetical and the Third. If the defendant is negligent at all in the Third
Hypothetical, it is because it is foreseeable that the worker will neg-
ligently get his hand in the press. The very thing we think the defendant
should protect against is the worker's own lapse or his own inability
to protect himself. So you are presented with an anomaly if you
relieve the defendant. You would be saying he must exercise due care
52. Both the facts and the legal principles are suggested by Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). Very similar facts have appeared in a number
of products cases. E.g., Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 119 N.H. 457, 404 A.2d 1094
(1979).
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to prevent the plaintiff from injuring himself through his own lapse,
but that, as soon as the plaintiff does injure himself that way, the
plaintiff is barred from recovery. This would be erecting a duty the
breach of which could never result in liability. It would be denying
relief in the very case the duty was intended to cover.
A leading case. On facts like these a leading case from New
Jersey, Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Co.," reasoned in just this
kind of way. It held that the defendant-employer was under a duty
to protect the plaintiff from the plaintiff's own lapses or inabilities,
and that consequently the employer could not escape liability under
the old rules of contributory negligence when such a lapse occurred.
And other examples. That kind of decision is paralleled in others,
sometimes on quite different facts. For example, it is said that a
hospital owes a patient a duty to protect the patient from his own
incapacities and that the hospital that fails to do so cannot escape
liability by claiming that a drunken or suicidal patient failed adequately
to care for himself when, after all, it was the hospital's duty to protect
the plaintiff from his own problems.5 4
Louisiana:. duty/risk analysis; does the principle survive? The idea
is well known, of course, in Louisiana as a part of the duty/risk
analysis, on which I will say more later. 5 The general idea seems to
be that in some cases the defendant is responsible to the plaintiff to
protect the plaintiff from his own faults or incapacities. Let me call
this the Bexiga principle after the New Jersey case.16 The question is
whether that principle, engendered as it was in the old regime of
contributory negligence, will carry over to a comparative negligence
system.
Johnson-Robertson differences. On this point two distinguished
scholars, Professors Robertson and Johnson, have disagreed. Professor
Robertson thinks there is no need to carry over the principle of
protecting the plaintiff from his own fault to a comparative negligence
regime.17 Professor Johnson thinks the principle should be carried
53. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
54. Warner v. Kiowa County Hosp. Auth., 551 P.2d 1179 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
55. Bexiga itself has been cited and relied upon by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Transp. Co., 488 So. 2d 978 (La. 1986); Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
56. I believe the principle is at least approximately the same as the duty-risk analysis
that is well-established in Louisiana jurisprudence, but I prefer to use a different designation
for the idea involved because the duty-risk terminology carries with it a whole history
and connotes some particular applications that I do not think are necessarily implicated
by adoption of the general principle.
57. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative
Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana,
44 La. L. Rev. 1343 (1984).
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over.5" I lean, as only members of the legal profession can, in both
directions. I believe the principle, correctly identified and limited;
should carry over; but I believe that few cases will qualify for the
special protection.
The passing of Baumgartner. Louisiana's Baumgartner decision 9
purported to apply a kind of duty/risk analysis to a rather ordinary
car-pedestrian accident, with the result that, Under the contributory
negligence regime, the plaintiff's fault was not counted against him
at all. With the adoption of comparative negligence, the Louisiana
Supreme Court overruled Baumgartner.60 However, Baumgartner seemed
to me to be more an effort to provide a humanitarian melioration
of the harsh rule of contributory negligence and less a straight ap-
plication of the duty-risk or Bexiga principle. If I am right, then to
overrule Baumgartner is not to overrule the duty/risk analysis under
comparative negligence or its application in cases like Bexiga.6'
Survival of the principle may depend on what the principle is. So
the question remains whether the Bexiga application of a duty/risk
analysis may be appropriately carried over to a comparative negligence
system. This may depend in part on what you think the principle
really is and the kinds of cases in which you think it will be applied.
Let me start by trying to sketch an approximation of the principle I
think involved.
IV. FORMULATING THE Bexiga PRINCIPLE
What the principle is NOT. The principle in allowing the plaintiff
to recover in the second hypothetical in spite of his own fault really
is a principle. It is not a matter of whimsy or bias or sympathy.
Although the principle might be buttressed by considerations of social
policy, 62 it is not itself a principle of policy as distinguished from
58. Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 La. L. Rev.
319 (1980).
59. Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978).
60. Turner v. N.O.P.S.I., 476 So. 2d 800 (La. 1985).
61. Bexiga itself has been cited with approval by the Louisiana Supreme Court with
the indication that it survives the adoption of comparative fault at least in products
liability cases. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985). There are many cases
on similar facts. E.g., Lanclos v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1985) (manufacturer of unguarded wood shaper, no comparative fault defense). But
although the principle might be especially appealing in products cases for policy reasons,
the justice reasons for the principle seem to go beyond products, and the idea has been
applied in many situations. E.g.,. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Transp. Co., 488
So. 2d 978 (La. 1986) (pre-comparative fault case, worker, warned of a hole in the floor,
forgot and stepped into it anyway, not barred by contributory negligence).
62. The Bexiga rule is consistent with a deterrence philosophy, since it imposes liability
on the actor most likely to respond with appropriate safety measures. Some thinkers might
regard it also as a desirable way of "distributing" the costs of injuries.
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justice or morality. It is, in fact, a principle about accountability.
The first element: The disabled plaintiff. One of the elements of
the principle is that the plaintiff is in a class of persons who cannot
protect itself from the risk in question. The idea that persons Under
a special disability should be protected from their own limitations or
even their own dangerous proclivities is not a new one. It reaches
back in tort law at least as far as the familiar cases involving statutory
duties. A defendant is commanded by statute not to pass a halted
school bus; 63 or not to sell dangerous items to minors. 64 The defendant
who violates the statute cannot claim contributory negligence as a
defense. The principle invoked is the one in the Third Hypothetical:
it was his duty to protect the plaintiff from himself. What Bexiga
suggests is that the principle is not limited to chronic disabilities, such
as those of small children or those suffering mental disabilities. It is
enough under Bexiga that the machine would be used in a repetitive
routine that would dull the senses and reflexes even of the most alert
and that the risk of an operator's negligence was known to the
defendant .65
A second element: non-reciprocal risks. There may be a second
element in the principle. It may not be enough that the plaintiff
cannot protect himself. It may also be important that the plaintiff
inflicts no substantial risks upon others by his contributory fault. The
Third Hypothetical is a very good illustration of a plaintiff who may
63. Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Cent. School Dist., 21 N.Y. 2d 239, 234 N.E. 2d
243, 287 N.Y.S. 2d 77 (1967).
64. See generally Prosser & Keeton on Torts at 461. There is much current litigation
over the duty of one who supplies alcohol to a drinker who may later drive. Although
many of the cases involve injuries suffered by third persons when the intemperate drinker
drives negligently, some cases have approved the idea that the drinker himself, or his
estate, may recover. Klingerman v. Sol Corp., 505 A.2d 474 (Me. 1986); Brannigan v.
Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d
655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983). But the effect, if any, of the drinker's own contributory
negligence in becoming intoxicated, is far from certain. In Blake v. Moore, 162 Cal. App.
3d 700, 108 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1984), the drinker's recovery was reduced for his comparative
fault. In Weldy v. Town of Kingston, 514 A.2d 1257 (N.H. 1986), police stopped but
did not arrest drinking teenagers. The car they were in later crashed and the teenagers
and survivors sued the town for failing to effect an arrest to protect the teenagers. The
court approved a recovery subject to a comparative negligence reduction. A recovery was
denied as to a claimant whose negligence was deemed greater than that of the police
because of New Hampshire's modified comparative negligence rule. The parties seem not
to have argued the Bexiga principle.
65. This statement may seem to imply that the plaintiff was not in fact guilty of
contributory negligence at all in Bexiga. I believe the trier of fact could properly have
found no contributory negligence on these facts and also on the facts of Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Southwestern Transp. Co., 488 So. 2d 978 (La. 1986). But I don't know that
such a finding would be required, so the issue is an important one in determining what
the trier should be told to do if it finds contributory fault.
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be at fault, but whose fault is dangerous only to himself. After all,
the press can smash his hand, but his hand will not hurt the press.
.Certainly you can say his claim not to be barred by contributory fault
is a stronger one because the risks in the case were one-sided against
him. The risks were not, in Wex Malone's term, "mutual. ' 66 In the
diction of George Fletcher, the risks were non-reciprocal.6 7 If the
plaintiff's faulty conduct not only threatens himself but also subjects
others to substantial and unreasonable risks, I think his claim to be
relieved of the consequences of his fault is considerably less persuasive.
A third element: defendant's knowledge or reason to know the
plaintiff's disability. There is, of course, a final element. The defend-
ant who neither knows nor has reasonable ground to foresee the
plaintiff's inability to protect himself comes under no duty to protect
the plaintiff from his own fault. Such a defendant may not be negligent
at all-that's the First Hypothetical-but even if he is, there is no
reason not to invoke the ordinary rules of contributory negligence.
In other words, the defendant's duty of care to protect the plaintiff
from the plaintiff's own fault, incapacity, or dangerous proclivities
should be invoked only when the defendant knows or should know
of the plaintiff's limited ability to care for himself. Defendant's knowl-
edge of danger alone would not be enough if the defendant did not
also know of the plaintiff's limited ability to achieve safety for himself.
V. APPLICATION OF THE Bexiga PRINCIPLE
A. The Role of Accountability
How should the principle be applied? If the general description
of the principle in the Third Hypothetical is a reasonably sound one,
there still remains the question of how it might be applied and the
further question whether it should carry over into comparative neg-
ligence regimes.
Application: respect for self-determination. The first thing I want
to say about application of the idea is that it can only make sense
as good law if it is applied with respect for the co-eval principle of
accountability. No plaintiff should be permitted to say, "Protect me,
I am irresponsible." The principle of accountability has roots in respect
for autonomy as well as in a demand for responsibility. The law has
no business being paternalistic or requiring others to be paternalistic
on behalf of autonomous, self-determining citizens.
66. See Malone, Some Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 1981 Utah L. Rev.
91, reprinted in W. Malone, Essays on Torts 197 (1986) ("The symmetry of the predicament
... the mutality of risk .... ").
67. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972).
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-in a comparative negligence system. This means that the principle
should not be invoked to protect those who really can and should
protect themselves. For those who really can protect themselves, the
meliorating principle of Bexiga, even if properly invoked under the
regime of contributory negligence, assuredly should not carry over to
the comparative negligence regime.
B. Testing the Principle
1. Application-Case 1: The Mentally Disabled Plaintiff. I would
like to suggest four pattern cases in which the principle of the Third
Hypothetical might be tested. 6 Because these cases all test the Third
Hypothetical, I will try to avoid confusion by calling them "cases"
instead of "hypotheticals."
Case 1. A mentally disabled adult. John Clay, a mentally
disabled adult, worked for a farmer, Johnson. Johnson took
Clay as a foster child, an arrangement made with the welfare
department. Johnson put him to work with machinery on the
farm, and explained his duties, but did not explain the dangers.
Clay put his hand in a grinder and it was severely injured.
A reasonable person would have perceived the risk and would
not have put a hand in the grinder. Clay did not adequately
perceive the risk because of his mental limitations. In Clay's
suit against Johnson the defense was contributory negligence.
69
Solutions based on adherence or exceptions to the ordinary stand-
ard of care. One solution is to bar recovery on the ground that the
plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence because mentally disabled
people are under the same standard of care as other persons. This is
in fact the traditional view in the common law systems70 and one
adopted by the Restatement. 7' This awful result could be avoided by
rejecting the objective standard of care and holding mentally disabled
persons to some lesser standard of care, but that is a result we might
not like if the mentally disabled person injures another rather than
himself.72 The result could also be avoided by holding that the standard
is that of the reasonable prudent person when the mentally disabled
68. All four cases are taken from D. Dobbs, Torts and Compensation, Personal
Accountability and Social Responsibility for Injury 241 (1985).
69. The facts are suggested by Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W. 2d 272 (Mo. Ct. App.
1965).
70. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 135.
71. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283B (1965).
72. Louisiana's solution in this regard is unique as far as I know. See Turner v.
Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270, 273-74 (La. 1975) (nondiscerning persons not liable but their
curators are).
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person is a defendant, but is more lenient when he is a plaintiff. This
would have the disadvantage of treating similarly situated people very
differently; it might not violate equal protection, but it certainly does
not seem very even-handed in administration of the law.
Allowing recovery under the Bexiga principle. In my view the best
solution in a contributory negligence regime is to allow recovery by
the mentally disabled person in this case, but to allow it on the
principle in the Third Hypothetical. The farmer knows of the disability
and is under a duty to use care toward the plaintiff-including care
to prevent harm due to the plaintiff's own disability. Given such an
obligation, the reason for the bar of contributory negligence disappears
altogether.
Does the Bexiga Rule in Case I Survive Adoption of Comparative
Negligence? Do these conclusions carry over to a system of comparative
fault? If so, the plaintiff would continue to make a full, rather than
a reduced recovery. I believe a full recovery is required even after
the adoption of comparative fault rules.
-Common values of accountability. This seems to follow from
common values about accountability. Ideally, we want each individual
to be responsible for himself and accountable to others for harms
caused by fault. But in Case 1 we know that the plaintiff cannot be
responsible for himself. The very source of the defendant's duty of
care is his own recognition that the plaintiff cannot care for himself.
Accountability in this case requires the defendant to protect the plain-
tiff from himself; and conversely, the plaintiff is not held responsible
for himself. If there is ever a case in which the defendant is under
a duty to protect the plaintiff from his own fault, surely it is one
like Case 1 where liability comports with all our traditional feelings
about responsibility for self and accountability to others. To import
comparative negligence into this situation would be at odds with these
notions of accountability."'
73. These statements do not explicitly address the question whether the principle
should carry over to a comparative fault regime when the plaintiff is guilty, not merely
of contributory negligence but some form of more serious and self-destructive behavior.
In Argus v. Scheppegrell, 459 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984), a doctor was found
to have been seriously negligent in prescribing addictive drugs to a teen-ager, with little
record keeping or control. The risk seems to have been that she would abuse the drugs
and either negligently or intentionally take an overdose. She did in fact die of an overdose
from a rather large prescription. The court thought that while the doctor's duty extended
to protecting her from her own carelessness, it did not extend to protecting her from her
deliberate decision to take the pills. But I believe that if the doctor's negligence was a
failure to protect her from the mental and emotional deterioration that arises from drug
abuse, that duty would necessarily encompass protecting her from a drug-induced desire
for self-destruction as well. The facts in the case are not fully developed with respect to
the teen-ager's state of mind.
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2. Application-Case 2: Contributory Fault That Also Creates
Risks to Others
Case 2. Kincheloe, a child of 12, is driving a car on a rural
road. His neighbor, Davis, was driving in excess of the speed
limit in the opposite direction, approaching Kincheloe. He
recognized Kincheloe and knew Kincheloe was inclined to take
his father's car off and pull dangerous stunts. Nevertheless,
Davis did not slow down. Kincheloe pulled over in Davis'
lane, and Davis was unable to avoid collision because of his
speed. Both Davis and Kincheloe were injured. In Kincheloe's
claim against Davis, contributory negligence of Kincheloe was
pleaded as a defense.
Incapacity in Case 2. The plaintiff here is known by the defendant
to be under a disability-he is a child-actor who is known to engage
in dangerous stunts, presumably because of his limited experience.
For this reason, we might impose upon the defendant the kind of
duty recognized in the Third Hypothetical-to use care to protect the
boy from his own dangerous propensities.
A difference: risks to others. But here the plaintiff has not only
created risks to himself in the classic pattern of contributory fault;
he has also created risks to others, possibly even to others besides
the defendant. In this respect the case is quite different from the
appealing facts of the mentally disabled farm worker who puts his
hand in the grinder. The concerns here are doubled. We deal not only
with the plaintiff's responsibility to care for himself, but also his
accountability to others for injury he causes them.
The no-child negligence solution. One solution here is to throw
up your hands and declare that children of this age cannot be negligent.
This solution would allow the boy to recover fully for his injury and
would not impose any liability upon him for the injury he caused the
other driver. Possibly this is the worst imaginable solution. It depends
on a unrealistic premise-that a child cannot be negligent-and it
works the double result of allowing him to avoid both self-respon-
sibility and accountability to others.
Differential between negligence and contributory negligence solu-
tion. Another solution I do not favor would say that a child of this
age can be guilty of negligence but not contributory negligence. Since
one and the same act are involved both in the negligence and con-
tributory negligence claim-that is, driving on the wrong side of the
road, presumably not keeping a lookout-the distinction between neg-
ligence and contributory negligence here if not everywhere does not
seem very convincing. It would hold Kincheloe accountable to others
for his act, but not responsible for his own well-being. In a society
that seeks to encourage self-reliance, autonomy, and responsibility,
this distinction seems unsound.
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The Bexiga principle as a solution. What other solutions are pos-
sible if these are not such good ones? One is to apply the principle
of the Third Hypothetical or the duty/risk analysis and hold that
Kincheloe can recover fully because he was acting under an incapacity
that was known to the defendant, so that the defendant was under
a duty to protect Kincheloe from his own dangerous propensities. The
effect of this solution would be, apparently, the same as saying children
cannot be found negligent at all. Kincheloe would recover fully and
he would not be held accountable to others injured by his misconduct.
If you believe that children are not moral beings, capable of making
decisions on their own, then this result is appropriate. Otherwise it
rejects the possibility of accountability and the compensation that goes
with it, and also the possibility of responsibility for one's self. If
Kincheloe really is capable of safer behavior, to allow his full recovery
of damages and at the same time to deny that he is responsible for
injury caused others seems to reject social policy in favor of com-
pensation and moral obligations of responsibility.
Conclusion: the Bexiga principle does not survive adoption of
comparative negligence in Case 2. If this analysis is correct, a case
like this one calls for a straight application of comparative negligence.
Kincheloe would not be barred by his fault, but would recover damages
subject to diminution if the trier finds him guilty of contributory
fault; at the same time, he-or possibly his parents-would be liable
for the damages to Davis, subject to diminution for Davis's fault.7 4
The result would be different if you believe that in fact Kincheloe
was incapable of ordinary safe driving and also that Davis knew it;
that scenario would invoke the principle in the Third Hypothetical.
3. Application- Case 3: Defendant Does Not Know the Need for
Special Care.
Case 3. Paulin, a retarded adult, walked down a rural road
in the pre-dawn hours. He walked on the right side and wore
dark clothes. Dalrymple was driving in the same direction. As
he neared Paulin, a car came from the opposite direction and
Dalrymple dimmed his lights. He never saw Paulin until the
last minute. He struck Paulin, who was seriously injured.
Contributory negligence was the defense in Paulin's claim
against Dalrymple.
75
74. Kincheloe might be held to an adult standard of care in some states either because
he is carrying on an adult activity (driving) or because he is operating a dangerous
instrumentality. See Robinson v. Lindsay, 92 Wash. 2d 410, 598 P.2d 392 (1979); Krieger
v. Howell, 109 Idaho 704, 710 P.2d 614 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). Even under the child
standard of care, he may be held responsible when he fails to live up to that standard.
See Robertson v. Penn, 472 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
75. The facts are suggested by Dorais v. Paquin, 113 N.H. 187, 304 A.2d 369 (1972).
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Comparisons and contrasts; the plaintiff's unknown disability.
Case 3 is like Case 1 and different from Case 2 in that the mentally
retarded person who walks on the wrong side of the road in the dark
creates no significant physical risks to others. But it differs from Case
1 too. The defendant here, a driver who does not see the plaintiff
until the last moment, does not seem to know or have reason to know
that he is dealing with a disabled person. Contrast Case 1 where the
farmer knew of his worker's disability.
An argument for comparative negligence reduction. To hold one
accountable for another's well-being is a serious thing at best; to hold
one accountable to protect an unforeseen other from herself, surely,
in a free society, requires some very special reasons. I would con-
sequently argue that while the plaintiff in Case 1 should recover an
undiminished amount even after comparative negligence, the plaintiff
in Case 3 should not. If the defendant in Case 3 was negligent at
all-a point of which I am in doubt-the plaintiff's damages should
be reduced for comparative negligence.
The Oliver case. In Oliver v. Capitano,76 a case much like Case
3, the plaintiff, who had a history of mental illness, was in a fit of
bizarre behavior; hallucinating, wandering, and playing on earth mov-
ing equipment. She was struck by a truck backing up. There was no
claim that the driver of the truck knew that the plaintiff was of
unsound mind at the time. Nevertheless, the court thought contributory
negligence would not necessarily be a bar, because the driver's duty
was to watch where he was backing to avoid injuring any person who
might not escape. This could include persons of unsound mind or
deaf persons who had not heard the backing truck.
Plaintiff's disability not known in Oliver. The truck driver in
Oliver seems to have had no ground for suspecting that he might be
in the vicinity of a person who needed special protection. Much less
was there any relationship between them that might impose any be-
yond-the-ordinary duty of care. Indeed, the finding of negligence is
itself quite sketchy. The driver used his rear-view mirrors and back-
up bell to secure safety. His negligence, if that is what it was, seems
to have been only that he did not have a helper stand down to see
that the path was clear. To impose a duty to care for a known or
foreseeable person under disability is one thing; to impose a duty to
care for a disabled person when no such person is to be expected is
quite another.
A suspicion. This leads me to suspect that Oliver is not really
like Case 3 at all but that it is instead a humanitarian effort to
meliorate the vicious consequences of the contributory negligence rule.
76. 405 So. 2d 1102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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But while Oliver succeeds admirably at doing so, it does not succeed
so well in respecting the full scope of the defendant's autonomy and
freedom to act, because the defendant, who had no reason to think
he had to act for the protection of a mentally disabled person, is
nevertheless subjected to liability in Oliver.71
Oliver under comparative fault. If I am correct in thinking that
Oliver really is not a Bexiga or duty/risk case but is instead a hu-
manitarian melioration of the old contributory negligence rule, then,
it seems to follow that the decision should become a dead-letter with
the adoption of a comparative fault scheme. Cases, like Oliver, in
the pattern of Case 3, call for application of ordinary comparative
negligence rules to reduce damages, if indeed the defendant is negligent
at all."T
This means that not all duty/risk cases are equal. Some case
patterns call for continued use of that analysis. Some do not.
4. Application-Case 4: Reciprocal Risks, Incapacity Unknown
Case 4. Perez and Dittman were both speeding as they
traveled south on a public highway. Perez, who was 13 years
of age, attempted to pass Dittman on a curve. At the same
time Dittman lost control and began to skid over to his left.
The two cars collided at this point. Each driver was injured.
Comparisons. Cases 2 and 3 each involved separate elements that
would argue against any special protection for the plaintiff. In Case
4 the two elements are combined. Perez is a minor and under at least
a legal if not an actual disability. But Dittman does not know of
Perez' minority so that in this respect he is in much the same position
as the defendant in Case 3 who does not know he is encountering a
mentally disabled person. In addition, Perez inflicts risks on others
as well as on himself.
The Bexiga principle should not survive adoption of comparative
fault in Case 4. Even if you think that the plaintiff should get the
benefit of the principle in the Third Hypothetical in either Case 2 or
Case 3, Case 4 is surely a case in which that principle should not
carry over into a comparative negligence system. It is, in fact, a very
77. The Oliver court's reliance on Baumgartner, which I believe is a doctrine of
humanitarian melioration rather than a true duty/risk analysis, might support my con-
clusion because Baumgartner has been held to have no application in the new comparative
fault regime. See text accompanying supra note 59.
18. Detailed facts might shift a case from the pattern represented by Case 3 and
Oliver into the pattern represented by the First Hypothetical-in which the defendant is
not negligent at all because he reasonably expects plaintiff to be able to protect himself.
in Case 3, Dalrymple might be negligent if he goes off the paved portion of the road
in the dark, but perhaps not negligent if he stays entirely on the road and merely fails
to see the dark-dressed stranger walking on the pavement.
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strong case for a straight application of the comparative negligence
rules under which each party may recover from the other with both
recoveries diminished to reflect the claimant's fault.
Charting the Four Cases
The cases can be diagrammed in this way:
Risk to:
Knew or should know
actor's
incapacity
did not
Self Only Self and/or
Defendant
Case 1 - Case 2
know of Case 3 Case 4
incapacity
C. Defendant's Knowledge or Reason to Know; Statistical Inflictions
Reconsidering: defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's disability. I
have suggested that in some cases the defendant should not be held to
the expanded duty to protect the plaintiff from himself because the
defendant had neither actual knowledge of the plaintiff's disability nor
reason to know of it. This was my view as to Case 3, where the
defendant driver struck the mentally disabled pedestrian but had no
reason to think that a pedestrian would not be able to protect himself.
I now want to suggest a possible qualification. Let me give you the
Fifth Case:
Case 5. Defendant constructs a metal light pole on the public
sidewalk. The pole is so designed that upon impact it will crack
open and there is a serious risk that wires will be exposed. This
in turn creates the risk of serious electrical shock to a driver,
passenger or even a bystander. Plemmons, driving negligently,
collides with the pole at a low rate of speed, but the pole splits
open like a bean pod, the wires pop out and Plemmons suffers
very serious electric burns.
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Differences: Lapse versus disability. This case is different from many
we have discussed. Plemmons has no special proclivity for risk, as in the
case of the 12-year old driver who like dangerous stunts. And he has no
permanent kind of disability that clouds his ability to perform everyday
tasks as in the case of the mentally disabled farm worker. He is merely
guilty of contributory negligence and on the surface it would seem that
his recovery should be diminished under the comparative negligence rules.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that even if Plemmons had had
a disability that inclined him to crash into light poles, the defendant did
not know about it.
Differences: condition creating constant risks. But there is something
else different here. The defendant in this case, unlike the others, has
created a risk not merely to this plaintiff but to a large category of
plaintiffs-to anyone in fact who is in a car being driven near one of
these poles and also to anyone who is near one of the poles when cars
are being driven nearby. The other cases we have considered have involved
defendants whose conduct was directed at very particular people; although
some of the defendants drove on the highway, thus creating risks to
anyone who might be around, they did not drive constantly on the highway
or create conditions that were unsafe for all highway users over long
periods. There is very good reason for saying that defendants whose
negligence is directed only at a particular plaintiff should not be compelled
to protect that plaintiff from his own faults unless the defendant knew
of those faults or had reason to know of them. But a defendant who
inflicts an unreasonable risk upon multitudes of people and does so by
a condition that remains risky not for a few moments but over a long
period of time, must anticipate that some of those upon whom the risk
in inflicted may be in no position to protect themselves.
The danger: carrying a good principle too far. Nevertheless, unless
you attach special weight to the fact that the plaintiff is injured by highly
unexpected electrical burns in Case 5,79 I see no reason not to use the
79. Special weight might be attached here because it might be thought that the risks
of plaintiff's conduct included harms from impact with the pole but not harms of electrical
burns. If you thought this, you would adopt the argument made at text accompanying
supra note 46. To avoid a side trip on this path, you could revise Case 5 to involve a
pole that is negligently placed or negligently guarded. A "special weight" might be attached
to the electrical burns on the ground that the risks are not reciprocal: plaintiff can be
burned but the defendant cannot. I think this argument depends on the same underlying
assumptions as the first argument and does not, therefore, stand as an independent ground.
That is, it is based on the belief that "burns" are different in kind from the other risks
associated with striking a pole. If Case 5 is revised to avoid these side trips, the pole
merely stands there and the plaintiff is harmed by impact with it. In that case the risk
of the plaintiff's conduct is the very one that came about. Furthermore, the risks imposed
by the plaintiff on the pole and those imposed by the company on the plaintiff, if not
precisely reciprocal, at least are interdependent: one cannot occur without the other.
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straight rules of contributory negligence. The principle of the Third Hy-
pothetical, if applied expansively, will consume the principle of self-
responsibility. What is characteristic of a good comparative negligence
case is the very fact that both parties are at fault, that the risk and the
injury is the joint product of their fault, and that the damages cannot
be apportioned.
Comparing the Rue Case. Case 5 is structurally similar to Louisiana's
well-known decision in the Rue case, s0 where the plaintiff drove off the
road and onto the shoulder. Striking a rut that should not have been
left there by the highway department, she lost control and her car flipped
over. The courts below held that her contributory negligence barred re-
covery, but the Supreme Court reversed.
-the first ground in Rue. I read the Supreme Court's decision as
giving two distinct reasons for the reversal. The first reason sounds very
much as if the court were saying that whatever the risks that made it
negligent to drive off on the shoulder, they did not include the risk of
getting the wheels locked in a rut. I take it this is an idea some courts
would express by saying that her contributory fault was not a "proximate
cause" of her injury.
-the second ground in Rue. The second reason given in the Rue
decision was that the highway department's "duty to maintain a safe
shoulder encompasses the foreseeable risk that for any number of reasons,
including simple inadvertence, a motorist might find himself traveling on,
or partially on, the shoulder." The principle of the Third Hypothetical
was thus invoked to allow recovery in spite of contributory negligence.
Why Rue might be a difficult example. In some ways Rue is a bad
example. As with the Third Hypothetical, it would be possible to decide
that the plaintiff is not guilty of contributory negligence at all. Some
people who go off the road are undoubtedly guilty of negligence in doing
so. Others may not be; there seems little risk in letting wheels run on
the shoulder in many cases, while in others the risk is quite distinct.
There are good reasons to steer hard right in some cases, not in others.
In the absence of evidence that there was some special and foreseeable
risk in driving off the road, it would be easy enough to solve the Rue
problem by finding no contributory negligence at all. The same might be
said of the Third Hypothetical. There the worker at a dull repetitive task
was almost certain sooner or later to make a wrong move in manipulating
the material under the press. The same could be said of the worker
carrying a box who steps in a hole, the presence of which he has been
warned about."' For those who share feelings of this kind, it may be
80. Rue v. State Dep't of Highways, 372 So. 2d 1197 (La. 1979).
81. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Transp. Co., 488 So. 2d 978 (La. 1986).
Michigan's Court, much divided, has found this difficult in the post-comparative fault
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hard to evaluate the question whether the Rue-type plaintiff should have
damages diminished under comparative negligence, because the underlying
feeling may be that there is no contributory negligence at all, or that if
there was the risks created by that negligence did not include getting
locked into a rut maintained by the state.
-accepting contributory fault as given. But if we can accept that in
a given case the driver is guilty of contributory negligence, and if that
negligence creates risks of the same order as the harm that came about,
then there seems no reason not to apply the ordinary rules of comparative
negligence, reducing the plaintiff's recovery of damages to reflect his own
share in responsibility. This result seems most appropriate on Rue-like
facts if the plaintiff is in fact guilty of fault, because if you do not draw
the line at the facts of Rue it is hard to see where you can draw it
without swallowing the whole principle of contributory fault.
A last clear chance. Indeed, once comparative negligence is adopted,
Rue is an excellent case for charging the plaintiff's fault against her
recovery, for it is the very reverse of the last clear chance case. In the
last clear chance case the plaintiff's fault creates a peril from which the
plaintiff cannot escape and the defendant discovers the peril and fails to
use reasonable care to avoid it.82 The old law under the contributory
negligence regime of course held that the plaintiff was not barred by his
earlier contributory fault because the defendant had the last chance to
avoid the injury. Explanations for this rule differ. Some have said that
it is really a rule of proximate cause; some have said that it is really
less a reasoned principle than a humanitarian exception to principles. I
would suggest that the last clear chance doctrine is a very special and
perhaps very expansive version of the principle in the Third Hypothetical. 3
Indeed, for this reason, I think the last clear chance or discovered peril
doctrines could well be abolished with the adoption of comparative neg-
ligence, so long as the narrower principle of the Third Hypothetical is
retained.
era. Perhaps its current view is that the plaintiff's negligence on these facts must count
against him. See Hardy v. Monsanto Enviro-Chem Sys., Inc., 414 Mich. 29, 323 N.W.
2d 270 (1982).
82. The classic case was Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 547, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex.
1842), where plaintiff had negligently placed his fettered ass near or on the road and it
was struck by the defendant's negligently driven wagon. See generally Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 479 (1965).
83. 1 think cases like Dufrene v. Dixie Auto Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 162 (La. 1979), are
more understandable as applications of the Bexiga rule or the duty/risk analysis than as
applications of the occult doctrines of last clear chance or discovered peril. There the
defendant, driving a car, failed to slow as he approached a child on a three-wheeled cycle
in the road. The cyclist turned in front of the defendant and there was a collision with
injuries.
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Case 5 and Rue as reversals of last clear chance. But be that as it
may, Case 5 and Rue represent reversals of the last clear chance situation,
for in Rue it is the plaintiff, not the defendant, who encounters a condition
created by earlier fault; it is a condition that cannot be changed now,
and only the plaintiff has the chance to avoid the injury.Y When the
shoe is on the other foot, the defendant is liable and the plaintiff's fault
is no bar to the plaintiff. A parity of reasoning would suggest in Rue,
not that the plaintiff should be given special consideration, but on the
contrary, that the plaintiff should bear the whole burden herself.
Case 5 and Rue should not survive adoption of comparative fault.
I am not suggesting that such reasoning be followed, only that when the
plaintiff is the best and indeed only source of safety when the moment
for action arrives, this is a very good sign that the plaintiff should be
asked to accept some self-responsibility. This means that, however right
Rue may have been under the old regime, the plaintiff in such a case
today should have to accept a reduced recovery to reflect comparative
fault.8'
D. Reconsidering the Third Hypothetical
Comparisons: Case 5 and the Third Hypothetical. If I am right about
Case 5, then was I wrong supporting the plaintiff in the Third Hypo-
thetical? After all, there we have a worker who, like the driver in Case
5, has no special disability; or if he has one it is not known to the
84. The plaintiff in a Rue situation may or may not create risks to others. But, generally
speaking, loss of control of a car on the highway, whether because of going off the road
or otherwise, is a risk to others as well as to oneself, and we are, I think, justified in
using this generality as our guide.
85. The analysis does not change even if the driver in Case 5 crashes into the light
pole as a result of his mental disability. The defendant who erected the pole not only does
not know of the plaintiff's disability, he created no special risks to disabled persons any
more than to others who drive into poles rather than around them.
A little more detail about my conclusion may be in order. Baumgartner, which is often
regarded as having used the duty/risk analysis in a rather ordinary contributory negligence
case, was overruled by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Turner v. N.O.P.S.I., 476 So. 2d
800 (La. 1985). Some interpret this as a decision that necessarily discards Rue as well. I
am less sure. Baumgartner seems to me to have been a case striving for some justice under
an unjust rule rather than a case applying a neutral principle. There is no basis for carrying
that humanitarian impulse into the comparative negligence scheme, since comparative neg-
ligence itself satisfies the humanitarian needs and at the same time provides a practical and
rational means for applying the principle of accountability for fault.
Rue might be different. You really can take the principle of the Third Hypothetical and
expand it to cover, not merely cases of serious disabilities as in the case of the farm worker,
but any case in which the plaintiff's contributory fault is foreseeable as one of the acts
necessary to the joint product of injury. Rationally speaking, I think you could overrule
Baumgartner with the advent of comparative fault but retain Rue. It is just that I don't
think you should.
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defendant who manufactured the dangerous machine. My reasoning in
Case 5 suggests that a defendant who creates a risk to large numbers of
people might indeed bear a special responsibility, but that this would not
be enough to relieve the plaintiff of all the consequences of his own
fault. Must I, on this same reasoning, then take the view that the plaintiff
in Bexiga-the Third Hypothetical-must be barred by his fault, or at
least that his fault must be used to reduce his damages in a comparative
negligence system?
A distinction: a narrow class in the Third Hypothetical. I believe you
could consistently hold the driver liable in Case 5 and at the same time
allow a full recovery for the worker in the Third Hypothetical. You could
emphasize the narrow class of persons to whom the risk is created in
Bexiga as a ground for a special duty to that class. You could even find
a special relationship between the manufacturer of the machine and the
worker who must use it-they may not know each other by name but
they are not legally strangers.
A better distinction: the worker's limited means of providing safety
for himself. But I think the important reason for allowing a full recovery
in Bexiga is this: the worker might avoid being contributorily negligent
in two different ways. He might manage to stay alert and suppress his
reflexes all during the dull day. If, however, he knows this is an impossible
task and that sooner or later he will reflexively run his hand under the
exposed press as it comes down, his only means of achieving safety for
himself is to quit his job. The trouble with quitting his job is that,
practically speaking, he really is not likely to have much choice. So for
most workers in this situation, there really is not a second means of
avoiding the danger. He must live with his own limited reflexes and the
demands of repetitive work and take the consequences, because he has
no options. This puts him in a position in which he must be able to get
safe appliances from others or, more or less inevitably, suffer the crushing
blow.
-the driver in Case 5 has choices. The driver in Case 5 is different.
In the first place, he is not ordinarily subjected to long, repetitive work
that dulls his reflexes, but if he is, he can stop the car and take a break
to avoid losing his capacity to drive properly. In the second place, he
may have many options about driving at all if he knows himself to be
a poor driver. He has choices about how to keep himself a safe driver
and even, at times, about when and where to drive. His position is not
like that of the worker, who has, in practical terms, no choice at all
about confronting the danger and perhaps no means of maximizing his
own ability to operate safely.
Bexiga should carry over to comparative negligence. Given these dif-
ferences, I have no hesitation in saying that a court could properly carry
over the principle in the Third Hypothetical to give a full recovery to a
worker there, but that it should not do so in Case 5 with the driver who
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runs into the light pole. That means the worker's recovery should not
be reduced, but the driver's should be, in a comparative negligence system.
CONCLUSION
Varied patterns. I have tried to suggest, not merely some diverse
cases, but some cases that fall into identifiable patterns. If you believe
that we should all ordinarily be responsible for ourselves and at the same
time be accountable for our wrongs to others, these patterns make some
kind of sense. They suggest that the plaintiff in a comparative negligence
system should sometimes recover nothing, sometimes recover everything,
and most often should recover reduced damages to reflect the plaintiff's
fault.
Protecting others; from drinkers, attackers. The Third Hypothetical
and the cases I used to test it in some ways reflect better than others
the legal temper of contemporary tort law. Tort law today is very much
wrapped up with the question of when one person should protect another.
A substantial number of cases in a substantial variety of situations have
held defendants responsible for plaintiffs' well-being. Many courts have
now held that a provider of alcohol to a drinker is liable in some
circumstances when the drinker drives negligently and harms the plaintiff.8 6
Some have extended this liability to social hosts.87 Some cases have held
that a building owner must protect invitees from criminal attack in or
near the building,88 or that lessors of property must protect their tenants. 89
Colleges have likewise been held responsible to protect their students from
violence, even where the violence does not erupt from conditions on the
campus at all. 90
-professionals' obligations. Professionals such as doctors or social
workers may be obliged to protect minors or even adults by reporting
injuries that might have resulted from abuse by others, and failure to
do so may lead to tort liability. 91 Professionals, including clergy, may
86. E.g., Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W. 2d 108 (1984); Chartrand
v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or. 689, 696 P.2d 513 (1985).
87. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Clark v. Mincks, 364
N.W. 2d 226 (Iowa 1985).
88. Isaacs v. Huntington Mem. Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr.
356 (1985); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y. 2d 507, 407 N.E. 2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.
2d 606 (1980).
89. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, (D.C. Cir.
1970).
90. Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E. 2d 331 (1983) (unidentified
attacker raped student in a dormitory room); Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College
Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984) (unidentified attacker
in parking lot).
91. See Thelen v. St. Cloud Hosp., 379 N.W. 2d 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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also be obliged to protect patients from their own suicidal tendencies92
and to protect third persons from their patients.93
-public entities; spouses. Courts have held public entities liable for
failing to protect drivers on the road by arresting dangerous persons 94 or
for failing to protect citizens from attack. 95 One court has even held that
a wife must warn the neighbors of her husband's dangerous sexual pro-
clivities.96
Autonomy and dependence. I do not suggest these liabilities are wrong;
indeed some of the cases that refuse to impose responsibilities trouble
me much more.97 But I do suggest that these cases reflect a growing
willingness to impose upon one person a responsibility for another. They
reaffirm the fact that even in a world where we strive for autonomy and
the self-responsibility that goes with it, we are highly dependent on many
others for our own personal safety. The Third Hypothetical and the cases
under it test how far we ought to go in requiring one person to protect
another from himself and where, instead, we must begin insistence of
self-reliance.
Trying to get the best of both worlds. If you want self-responsibility
you insist that the plaintiff take care of himself when he can do so. But
if you want accountability for wrongs, you insist that the plaintiff who
cannot protect himself is entitled to some human concern from the defend-
ant who can. This includes, for me, the worker in Bexiga or the Third
Hypothetical and the mentally disabled farm worker in Case 1. It does
92. See Nally v. Grace Community Church, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. App. 1984).
This is an especially troubling case. The claim was that the clergyman's counseling directly
inflicted distress and created dangers of suicide and in that respect liability is appealing.
But as this occurred in the course of "spiritual counseling" the interference with religious
activity is substantial.
93. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
94. Irwin v. Town of Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 467 N.E. 2d 1292 (1984). There are, to
be sure, contrary decisions. Everton v. Willard, 468 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 1985); Hildenbrand
v. Cox, 369 N.W. 2d 411 (Iowa 1985).
95. This applies only where there is a duty owed to the citizen, as where either she
or her attacker are identified more or less specifically. E.g., Sorichetti v. City of New
York, 65 N.Y. 2d 461, 482 N.E. 2d 70, 492 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (1985); Division of Corrections
v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986).
96. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980). Contra,
Rozycki v. Peley, 199 N.J. Super. 571, 489 A.2d 1272 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
97. For example, Roberson v. Allied Foundry & Mach. Co., 447 So. 2d 720 (Ala.
1984), where an employer hired work release prisoners on a late-night shift and gave
them freedom to leave during work hours. They did and raped a woman working nearby.
The court thought the employer had no special duty to concern itself with the well-being
of those around. Possibly the result is justified on the ground that the employer was not
negligent at all, but it is horrifying to think that the employer has no duty even to use
ordinary care.
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not include any person, such as the driver in Case 5, who can protect
himself, and most assuredly does not include any person who can not
only protect himself but whose conduct is a risk to others, as in Case
2.
Cases by case adjudication can take factors into account. In the end,
I have to say that I think the Courts of Louisiana have been wise to
leave much for case by case adjudication.9" That kind of adjudication
allows the factors suggested here-disability of a plaintiff, specific knowl-
edge or foreseeability by a defendant of that disability, and reciprocity
of risk-to be considered in determining when to allow full compensation
and when to invoke the comparative fault principles to diminish it.
Difficult ideas? I suspect any judge working with these ideas would
come to find them second nature and easy enough to work with. As a
morning's entertainment, however, all this may seem a little too Byzantine,
enough to make the emperor doze and trouble his sleep at the same time.
Comparative fault reduces risk of error. If so, there is one great
consolation. Comparative negligence reduces the impact of error. If we
wrongly allow a plaintiff a full recovery when we should reduce his
damage, or vice versa, the changes are very good that the error will not
be overwhelming. Still, within the limits of practicality and common sense,
we should try to follow the principles of accountability and self-respon-
sibility. I hope the cases discussed here will be helpful in that effort.
98. Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981) (as to strict liability cases); Motton
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); see Turner v. N.O.P.S.I.,
476 So. 2d 800 (La. 1985). In the latter case the court said: "Care should be taken,
however, to note that we do not hold that the victim's fault shall always reduce his
compensation. There are cases in our literature in which injured persons have been allowed
recovery (cases in which the contributory negligence of the plaintiff did not prohibit
recovery). Some of those cases (which we do not propose to specify) should produce the
same result today." 476 So. 2d at 804.
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